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Where Does Blaming Come From?
Lawrence M. Solan†
[Alvy and Annie are seeing their therapists at the same time
on a split screen]
Alvy Singer’s Therapist: How often do you sleep together?
Annie Hall’s Therapist: Do you have sex often?
Alvy Singer: Hardly ever. Maybe three times a week.
Annie Hall: Constantly. I’d say three times a week.1

In my earlier essay, “Cognitive Foundations of the
Impulse to Blame,” I argued that blaming comes cheaply for
people since the elements of the scenarios that most easily
trigger blame are commonly used in cognitive processes that
have little to do with moral attribution: causation, the
recognition of bad outcomes, and sensitivity to the minds of
others.2 I relied in part on an ingenious experiment designed
and run by Joshua Knobe, which demonstrates that people are
highly sensitive to the differences between good and bad
outcomes in their conceptualizations of the world.3 In his
response to my essay, Knobe uses much of the same material,
including his own experiments, to argue that I’ve gotten it
wrong.4 He argues that people are primarily involved in the
business of moral attribution, and the other cognitive processes
are the derivative ones. Thus, the quote from Annie Hall. In
this brief reply, I agree with Knobe that my analysis does little
to explain asymmetries between our blaming, on the one hand,
and giving credit, on the other, even though they both engage
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more or less the same conceptual primitives. However, Knobe’s
perspective leaves questions unanswered as well.
My original argument is as follows: Blameworthiness
occurs when an individual causes a bad result, and becomes
amplified when the perpetrator should have known better. All
elements of the prototypical blame scenario – causation, bad
outcome, and state of mind – are computed frequently in daily
life for a host of reasons having nothing to do with blame. For
example, conceptual development in children depends crucially
and robustly on their ability to hypothesize about the states of
mind of those from whom they learn, a phenomenon called
“theory of mind” in the developmental psychology literature.5
This makes moral attribution cognitively inexpensive. In fact,
it is so inexpensive that we sometimes manipulate facts either
to increase or decrease the likelihood and severity of the blame
impulse. In particular, when various interpretations of the
facts are available, we tend to focus on those facts that enable
us to reach a conclusion that is consistent with a desired
result.6
Knobe argues that I’ve drawn the wrong conclusion.
His claim is that “blame has had such a pervasive influence on
our cognitive capacities that, even when we are not specifically
interested in questions of blame, we often end up using
cognitive processes that arose chiefly because of their role in
making blame attributions.”7 Later, Knobe emphasizes that he
intends a weak version of the hypothesis that moral attribution
is cognitively prior to its elements:
Note that we are not here entertaining the absurd hypothesis that
people’s whole capacity for detecting causal relations arose out of a
need to make assessments of blame. The idea is simply that certain
aspects of this capacity – a capacity that presumably arose chiefly
out of a need for prediction and explanation – may also have been
shaped by a concern with attributions of blame.8

I have no problem with the weak version of Knobe’s
hypothesis, other than its evolutionary bent. The question we
are addressing is about how our psychology works today. To
5
See Solan, supra note 2, at 1020 nn. 66-68 (providing references to some of
the underlying psychological literature).
6
For discussion of the affective aspects of blame, see Mark D. Alicke,
Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 556, 566-68 (2000);
Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 368 (1992).
7
Knobe, supra note 4, at 930.
8
Id. at 934-35.
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the extent that my earlier essay speaks in such historical
terms, it is fairly subject to the same caution. Here, I will
comment briefly on where I think the evidence now stands.
Knobe relies on the results of an experiment that he has
designed and run that is both rich in its content and elegant in
its simplicity. In the first experiment, a lieutenant orders a
sergeant to send his squad to the top of a hill for strategic
reasons. One version of the story has the sergeant responding
that obeying this order will put the soldiers in the line of fire
and at risk of losing their lives.9 The other version has the
sergeant thanking the lieutenant for taking the soldiers out of
the line of fire.10 In both versions, the lieutenant replies that
he is not interested in the safety of the soldiers, but rather in
the greater strategic decision. Subjects hearing this story
blame the lieutenant for intentionally putting the soldiers at
risk in the first version, but do not give the lieutenant credit for
intentionally saving them in the second version.11
In my earlier article, I argued from a similar experiment
reported by Knobe that people are sensitive to the difference
between good and bad outcomes.12 But as Knobe correctly
points out, the experiment also shows that assignment of
intent – one of the elements of the impulse to blame according
to my account – itself depends upon whether the scenario is
blameworthy in the first place.13 What other explanation can
there be for the asymmetry between the two versions?
Knobe’s experiment surely shows that the blame
impulse cannot be reduced to its cognitive elements.14 For if it
could be, we would expect there to be a praise impulse as well.
The individual who indifferently causes lives to be saved
should be credited to the same extent as the individual who is
indifferent to causing death is blamed. Clearly, he is not.
Thus, it appears to be the case that our decisions to attribute

9

Knobe, supra note 3, at 192.
Id. at 192-93.
11
Id. at 193.
12
Solan, supra note 2, at 1017-18 (citing Joshua Knobe, International Action
and Side Effects in Ordinary Language, 63 ANALYSIS 190 (2003)).
13
Knobe, supra note 4, at 933-34.
14
Psychologists generally agree that concepts cannot typically be reduced to
knowledge of defining features. Knobe’s experiment shows that blame is a case in
point. For discussion, see GREGORY L. MURPHY, THE BIG BOOK OF CONCEPTS (2002); for
a contrary view, considering causation as one of a number of primitives into which
meaning may be decomposed, see RAY JACKENDOFF, FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE:
BRAIN, MEANING, GRAMMAR, EVOLUTION (2002).
10
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intent to an individual are influenced by whether the outcome
the individual has achieved is good or bad.
So far then, I agree with Knobe, and credit him with an
important and subtle contribution to the psychology of
intentionality. Nonetheless, there is a difference between the
conclusion that particular attributions of intent are influenced
by the outcome achieved (good or bad), and the conclusion that
our concept of moral attribution exists in some way as a
prerequisite to our internalized understanding of what intent
means. I believe that the results of Knobe’s experiment
support only the first of these conclusions. In fact, they
illustrate the second order effects that I described in my
original essay: Once a subject concludes that blame should be
assigned based upon the fact that the blameworthy individual
caused a bad outcome, affective considerations contribute more
and more to the degree of causation15 and, thanks to Knobe’s
contribution to learning in this area, apparently to the level of
intent as well. That is, as the facts permit, we conceptualize
situations to keep them consistent with theories we have
formed, including theories of blame based upon an individual’s
having caused the death of others, as in Knobe’s study.
The same holds true for causation, as already noted.
Knobe describes in his response a second study in which he
demonstrates that we are more likely to attribute causation
when harm results from an omission by a person with
responsibility to have performed an act than from the same
omission by a person with no such responsibility.16 Here,
however, there really is a symmetry with corresponding
scenarios that result in good outcomes. We are much more
likely to credit someone in a position of responsibility for
improving things by not taking a harmful action than to
similarly credit a passerby with no such responsibility. Thus,
this study appears to say more about differences between direct
and indirect causation than about moral attribution.17

15
For discussion of how people’s judgment of causation can be influenced by
their prior decision to attribute responsibility, see my earlier essay, Solan, supra note
2, at 1014-19 (discussing Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Causation,
Contribution, and Legal Liability: An Empirical Study, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
265 (2001)).
16
Knobe, supra note 4, at 934-36.
17
Languages often differ in their handling of direct and indirect causation to
a greater extent than does English. For discussion, see Solan and Darley, supra note
15, at 295-96.
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Moreover, it would be difficult to believe that causation,
which we have known since Pavlov to be understood by
animals as well as humans, to be motivated by considerations
of moral attribution.18 Yet, once again, our attribution in any
particular situation may well be influenced by considerations
including the prior assignment of blame.
In conclusion, Joshua Knobe has provided important
evidence to the effect that attribution decisions differ
depending on whether one is being accused of doing something
bad or praised for doing something good. In doing so, he has
focused attention on the fact that moral attribution is not
reducible to the presence of the elements that trigger it. My
earlier essay presents no reason why it should not be, making
Knobe’s contribution valuable. Yet Knobe’s essay does not go
so far as to demonstrate that the primitives of blaming are
somehow derived from blaming itself. Our essays, perhaps
happily enough, will by no means be the final word on these
important issues.

18
For recent studies on the concept of causality in primates, see MICHAEL
TOMASELLO & JOSEP CALL, PRIMATE COGNITION 92-94 (1997) (describing causality in
the cognition of apes).

